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Abstract of

The Target Method for Partnership Special Allocations and Why It Should Be
Safe-Harbored
By Daniel S. Goldberg
The Treasury Regulations’ concept of “substantial economic effect” is the holy grail of
partnership special allocations. Special allocations that have substantial economic effect will
come within a safe harbor in the regulations and have assurance that the allocations that are
provided in the partnership agreement will be respected. In order for the allocations to come
within the substantial economic effect safe harbor, the partnership must (1) maintain capital
accounts in accordance with the Treasury Regulations’ standard; (2) provide for liquidation in
accordance with capital accounts in all events; and (3) either (a) provide for a deficit restoration
obligation (DRO) on the partners, so that they have an obligation to restore any deficits in their
capital accounts, or, (b) in the alternative, include in the agreement a qualified income offset
provision (“QIO”), so that if a partner’s capital account drops below zero because of an
“unexpected distribution,” the partner who experiences this circumstance will be allocated a
sufficient amount of the partnership’s gross income to raise his capital account to zero. These
requirements are sometimes referred to as the “Big Three.”
The Treasury Regulations, by virtue of these safe harbor requirements, effectively push
drafters to write allocation sections of partnership agreements to comply with these
requirements, which the Article refers to as the Treasury Capital Account Method of Allocation.
An alternative approach to drafting allocation provisions is sometimes referred to as the
“Target Capital Account Method of Allocation” or more simply the “Target Method.” Under the
Target Method, all distributions are made in accordance with the partnership distribution
provisions. Even though capital account balances are maintained for the partnership in the same
manner as under the Treasury Capital Account Method, partners’ capital accounts do not govern
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the distributions upon liquidation of the partnership, which they do under the Treasury Method.
Rather, distribution provisions determine liquidation distributions without regard to the partners’
capital accounts. However, allocations of income, gain, losses and deductions are made and
affect capital account balances in a manner so that the capital accounts reflect liquidation
distribution priorities.
This Article discusses both methods and argues in favor of the superiority of the Target
Method in both achieving the economic goals of the partners and in achieving the overriding
purposes of the Section 704(b) special allocation regulations. It sets forth and analyzes several
situations in which the two allocation methods diverge in liquidation distribution results and
explains how the Treasury Capital Account Method may fail to carry out the economic deal of
the partners whereas the Target Method always does.
In the course of the discussion of the Target Method, the Article addresses several
important interpretive issues in the current Treasury Regulations that inject unfortunate doubt
regarding the acceptability of Target Method allocations for partnerships that desire certainty that
their allocations will be respected, which drafters of allocation provisions should be aware of and
appreciate. The Article ultimately recommends revision of the partnership special allocation
regulations to safe-harbor Target Method allocations.
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